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This paper's key conclusion is that church doctrine about the afterlife is a 
function of factors predictable with economic theory. Religion, like govern­
ment, family, and community can enforce property rights and encourage social­
ly valuable behavior. Religious doctrines about hell as punishment for breaking 
rules that arguably benefit society will occur in religions in cultures where the 
church is relatively more influential than the family, community, and govern­
ment. Statistical material from the Human Relations Area Files tends to sup­
port the model's implications as does informal analysis of New England colo­
nial Puritan doctrine about hell. (JEL: L 39, L 31) 
1. Introduction 
A common feature of religions is that they provide information about the 
afterlife. Such information is of obvious interest. The potential value of a 
blissful eternal life, for one, is substantial indeed. But many religions promote 
doctrines about the afterlife that are literally the antithesis of bliss. Hell's 
objective, in any of its various incarnations, is to minimize consumer utility. 
Why would a church hold as part of its doctrine the possibility that some or all 
of its members are condemned to an exceedingly unpleasant eternal future? 
This paper's objective is to explore church behavior using economic method­
ology. Of particular interest is church doctrine regarding the afterlife. Our key 
conclusion is that church doctrine about the afterlife is an endogenous variable 
in cultures and is a function of factors predictable with economic theory. 
Religion is an enormously complicated human activity. This paper is in no 
way a comprehensive treatment of the subject. Rather, this paper intends only 
to give insight into certain facets of religion by applying the methodology of 
* We thank Lisa Fell and Levon Yengoyan for their research assistance. We thank 
Roger Congleton, Bruce Pietrykowski, Jennifer Roback, Patricia Smith, anonymous 
referees, and seminar participants at George Mason University's Center for Study of 
Public Choice for comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Gerald Moran for advice. 
Dr. Hull acknowledges support from The University of Michigan-Dearborn's Campus 
Grants program. 
448 Brooks B. Hull and Frederick Bold JJIl1TIE 
economics. The economics of religion is an important emerging area of study, 
but is as yet immature and will only supplement, never replace, research in other 
fields. Readers should treat this paper as an illustration of the potential for 
applying economic theory to religion and as an invitation to explore the subject 
further. 
A useful first step in modelling church behavior is to treat churches as firms 
producing a mix of valuable products. A number of authors explicitly model 
churches as firms. EKELUND, HEBERT and TOLLISON [1989] and THORNTON 
[1992] look at the firm-like rent-seeking activities of the Roman Catholic 
Church. IANNACCONE [1991] models church membership across countries by 
treating churches as firms in a religious market. Churches can be treated as 
firms even when a formal church structure is absent - when a church is orga­
nized by an informal association of individuals. IANNACCONE [1992], for exam­
ple, uses this approach to address the issue of unusual behavior required of 
religious sect members. 
These papers study churches as firms in the religion industry, approaching 
the subject from a number of directions. Critical to explaining the behavior of 
firms in any industry, however, is understanding the industry's products. Firms 
in an industry sell a particular product or set of products because doing so 
reduces information costs to consumers and captures gains from producer 
specialization and economies of scope. As we show in earlier work, religions 
produce a unique set of products. Religions offer fellowship, provide various 
forms of entertainment, enforce appropriate social behavior, predict or influ­
ence the future, and provide information about the afterlife (HULL and BOLD 
[1989]). The third and last of these products are interrelated since, as is ex­
plained later, church doctrine about the afterlife can encourage appropriate 
social behavior. Note that the question of whether to adopt the standard 
assumption of the theory of the firm that churches maximize profit is not 
particularly important but is considered .briefly later in the paper. 
2. Why Hell? 
The church products named above are valuable to consumers and fit our 
expectation that firms produce utility-increasing goods. Hell does not fit this 
expectation. Why might churches have doctrines about hell? Three reasons 
suggest themselves. 
First, the church may simply be providing valuable (albeit unpleasant) infor­
mation in the same way medical doctors provide information to patients about 
unpleasant or even terminal diseases. Churches surely take this view. Informa­
tion about the afterlife may well satisfy an important human psychological need 
to understand the infinite and deal with death. 
If churches provide afterlife information, two implications follow. The first 
is that all religions will have roughly the same doctrines about heaven and hell, 
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just as the bulk ofmedical doctors diagnose a given set of symptoms in a similar 
fashion. This implication follows if accurate information about the afterlife is 
obtainable before death. If accurate information about the afterlife is unobtain­
able, church afterlife doctrine will have no pattern across cultures, its character­
istics will be distributed randomly. Importantly, for both of these implications, 
doctrines about heaven and hell will not be influenced by the structure of the 
religion industry or other cultural characteristics. That is, for example, a 
monopoly religion's doctrine about heaven and hell should be similar to (or not 
systematically different from) that in a society with multiple competing sects 
and religions. 
A second possible hypothesis about church afterlife doctrine is that heaven 
and hell are nearly ideal tools to expropriate rents. Church officials can promise 
heaven to those who transfer wealth to church officials and threaten hell to 
those who do not. In principle, enforcement is perfect, although the church 
must incur costs to convince people of the doctrine's validity. 
This extortion hypothesis seems more plausible in situations where the 
church's organizational structure includes a subgroup that can gain at the 
expense of the bulk of members. EKELUND, HEBERT and TOLLISON [1989] adopt 
this assumption in analyzing the Medieval Christian church's attitude toward 
usury, arguing that church officials in Rome gained wealth and power by 
opportunistically enforcing and interpreting church usury doctrine. The period­
ic revelations about exploitive behavior of some itinerant and broadcast media 
evangelists in the United States are also consistent here. 
A third reason church doctrine might include hell is that heaven and hell are 
effective methods of encouraging members to engage in valuable social behav­
ior. Heaven rewards desirable behavior and hell increases the expected cost of 
misbehavior, causing an increase in enforcement effectiveness. 
This view is very much in the spirit of SKOG and STUART'S [1982] model of 
a social contract. Individuals can benefit collectively and agree ex ante to a 
system of property rights enforcement that will result in some of the individuals 
being punished and so worse off ex post. In the same vein, note that sports 
leagues hire referees. Similarly, GAUTHIER [1986] shows how morality con­
strains individual behavior in a way that is socially beneficial. FRANK [1988, 
250] explicitly mentions the potential importance of heaven and hell in prevent­
ing undesirable opportunistic behavior. Note that this view of the purpose of 
religion needs not compete with the model of the church as a rent seeker. A 
successful rent-seeking church must produce valuable products, just as a profit­
maximizing firm produces valuable products. 
Churches often clearly encourage a number of activities which are valuable 
socially. An important example is church enforcement of individual behavior 
through rules like the Ten Commandments. When members of a society agree 
on uniform standards of behavior, transaction costs and the costs of enforcing 
property rights fall. Such behavior standards are extraordinarily useful to a 
society, a notion recognized by researchers like CHEUNG [1972] and POSNER 
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[1980]. Other examples of church-provided social goods include preservation of 
knowledge, some kinds of scientific research, education (MARTY [1970, 76]), 
income redistribution, and rules of cleanliness, medical treatment, food prepa­
ration, and sanitation. 
Although we see here that the church afterlife doctrine helps encourage 
production of valuable social goods, we have yet to explain why the church 
would employ hell. In principle, the church can make any claim about the 
amount ofutility after death. Why wouldn't the church simply increase without 
limit the rewards in heaven rather than also increasing the cost of misbehavior 
by threatening punishment in hell? 
A formal mathematical argument is unnecessary. We need only adopt the 
plausible assumptions that individuals have a diminishing anticipated marginal 
utility from the different possible afterlives. Assume individual utility is in part 
a function of claims made by the church about the potential afterlives. The 
church determines or reveals characteristics of the afterlife and individuals 
evaluate these claims in terms of utility. A simple implication of the model is 
that even intensely faithful individuals who are certain of the existence of an 
afterlife might knowingly commit mortal sins. Given discounting, the present 
cost ofan infinity in hell is finite. Sufficient temporal reward justifies mortal sin. 
Alternatively, the utility function can be interpreted as a measure of the 
plausibility of church claims about the afterlife. At some point "unrealistic" 
claims about the afterlife tend to reduce its perceived utility. McDANNELL and 
LANG [1988, 13] show, for example, how Jewish and Christian versions of 
heaven in the early Christian era were similar to one another and promised 
relatively modest improvements in wealth after death. Individuals in the first 
century would surely have rejected Jewish and Christian doctrine if heaven had 
been described as the standard of living currently enjoyed in industrial coun­
tries. 
Why invent hell? Because increases in claimed rewards in heaven have dimin­
ishing marginal effect on individual utility and subsequent sacred behavior. At 
some point, the introduction of even a modestly unpleasant hell is more effec­
tive at altering individual behavior than is an increase in the claimed wealth in 
heaven. 
To maximize the appropriate sum of sacred activities, the church equates the 
marginal effectiveness of claims about heaven and hell. So long as claims about 
hell are even somewhat plausible, the church always reaches a point where 
claims about heaven are less effective at the margin than claims.about hell. 
Although it is not necessary to do so, a more realistic and more complicated 
model would impose education costs on the church for the afterlife claims it 
makes. The church would now equate the marginal effectiveness of both heaven 
and hell claims to the marginal education cost. The model's implications are not 
affected, however. 
An implication of the above is that religions which successfully encourage 
significant behavior alteration will feature both heaven and hell. This paper 
451 150/3 (1994) Hell, Religion, an"d Cultural Change 
asserts that these cases will occur in cultures where churches are important 
enforcers of appropriate social behavior. By extension, in cultures where the 
church is not an important enforcer of social behavior, church doctrine will 
emphasize neither heaven nor hell. Certainly mainstream Christian and Jewish 
doctrine in the United States gives little attention to heaven and hell. Interest­
ingly and consistent with the model, Catholic and many Protestant denomina­
tions formerly had strong heaven and hell doctrines. 
3. Production of Valuable Social Goods 
The incentive of a firm like the church to provide social goods is not as obvious 
as in the production of ordinary products. In the ordinary case, firms choose 
products that are valuable to consumers and that can be sold at a profit. Social 
goods are not the sort of product that a consumer simply buys. In addition to 
being collective, social goods are not readily definable as products, nor do 
churches ordinarily market social goods explicitly. 
However, a plausible argument can be made that churches will provide social 
goods even without a conscious decision to do so. The argument is straightfor­
ward. In situations where it has a comparative advantage in encouraging pro­
duction of social goods, a church which does so will prosper and survive. This 
will occur in part because such a church helps its host society prosper and 
survive and in part because such a church attracts members. 
Anthropologists and sociologists certainly accept the proposition that reli­
gious institutions can have unintended consequences beneficial to society: 
"The hypothesis, therefore, is that in what we regard as false religions, though the 
performance of religious rites does not actually produce the effects that are expected or 
hoped for by those who perform or take part in them, they have other effects, some at 
least of which may be socially valuable." (RADCLIFFE-BROWN [1959, 154]) 
HARRIS [1966] makes a similar argument in outlining unintended benefits of 
the Hindu religion's treatment ofsacred cows. MOORE [1957] shows how divina­
tion practices by Arctic hunters increase the long-run probability ofa successful 
hunt and reduce the social cost of a failed hunt. DURKHEIM [1915, 80] explains 
how useless religious doctrines tend to disappear: "But an error and especially 
a system of errors which leads to, and can lead to nothing but mistaken and 
useless practices, has no chance of living." In Harris's words: "No purely 
religious urge can run counter to economics and ecology for a long time" 
(HARRIS [1977, 137]). 
The preceding argument is functionalistic. It makes the social Darwinist 
assertion that societies with efficient institutions will dominate other societies 
over time. The functionalist view has been disputed since it does not make clear 
how individuals facing greater gains from opportunistic behavior will engage in 
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collectively beneficial behavior. The prisoner's dilemma is the classic presenta­
tion of this critique. 
In response, we first should not underestimate the ability of individuals to 
recognize the ultimate gain from supporting institutions that are collectively 
beneficial. In principle, churches can adopt any number of doctrines about 
appropriate member behavior or, for that matter, make no demands at all. 
However, some doctrines will be more attractive to potential members, and 
churches with attractive doctrines will prosper. An "attractive" doctrine can 
well be one that people consciously or unconsciously perceive as useful to the 
community, not merely one that is easy - SKOG and STUART'S [1982] model is 
again applicable. Employing a similar approach, IANNACCONE [1992] shows 
how religious sects can make all members better off by requiring that each 
engage in unusual or unpleasant behavior. Eighteenth century philosopher 
Bernard MANDEVILLE recognizes this phenomenon as well: 
"Another Proof, that Men generally are persuaded of the Truth of the Gospel, is, that 
the Duties and Severities of the Christian Religion seem so reasonable to them, that they 
would abominate anyone who would preach up loose Morals; ..." (MANDEVILLE [1720, 
18-19], as quoted in LEVY [1992, 5]). 
Importantly, recent research is also showing that appropriate social behavior 
can directly benefit individuals and has survival value. We therefore need not 
rely completely on a functionalistic argument at the societal level to assure that 
churches will provide social goods. VANBERG and CONGLETON [1992], for exam­
ple, show that in repeated prisoner's dilemma games with an exit option (rea­
sonable in a market setting), moral individuals dominate a market - morality 
being defined as never defecting, but exiting if the opponent does. BERGSTROM 
and STARK [1993] use a somewhat different game-theoretic model to arrive at 
the same conclusion. SAMUELSON [1993] points out the role of inclusive fitness 
in assuring the survival of altruistic genes. ELLICKSON [1991, 167-183] shows 
how individuals who interact on multiple dimensions and have several simple 
rules of morality will arrive at optimal market solutions to common property 
problems. 
The foregoing shows that appropriate moral behavior benefits individuals 
and societies. Further, churches can gain by producing or encouraging the 
production of valuable social goods like appropriate moral behavior even 
without having made a conscious decision to do so. Obviously, however, 
churches are not the only producers of social goods. Especially in modern 
industrial states, governments produce any number of the social goods dis­
cussed earlier in the paper. In addition, social goods often are provided within 
families. Also, a community may feature a social structure or mutually enforced 
rules that assure provision of social goods. Smaller ethnic groups often encour­
age appropriate member behavior (HOLLANDER [1990, 1166]; CARR and LANDA 
[1983]). 
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Some social goods can be produced by private firms. However, an important 
part of the definition of the term is that social goods have public goods charac­
teristics. Private markets find production of public goods difficult due to the 
free rider problem and the difficulty in making copsumers reveal their prefer­
ences. 
A key question, then, is to what extent economic theory explains the relative 
importance in societies of the various non-private ways to provide social goods. 
The total output of social goods in an economy is a function of the outputs of 
the various producers. Unlike products in ordinary markets, the market output 
is probably not the simple sum of the outputs of individual producers. Govern­
ment and church standards might complement one another or contradict one 
another, for example. 
All societies employ methods to enforce property rights, although the total 
amount and mix of suppliers differ. Let the overall output of one or more social 
goods be a function of inputs of religious doctrine, government, and the family 
or community: 
Social Goods = S (religion, government, community). 
Institutions like the church tend to prosper to the extent that they are lower 
cost producers and to the extent that the demand for social goods remains 
strong. If the relative cost of religious inputs to production of social goods is 
low, religion will become relatively more important than government, the 
family, and the community in encouraging appropriate behavior. If the demand 
for social goods increases, all of the producers will increase their output and the 
relative mix of religious and other producers will change depending on the 
nature of the cost functions. 
The preceding suggests that certain characteristics of church doctrine are 
predictable. Practically by definition, religion is the institution that provides 
non-temporal enforcement. Thus, religious enforcement will be more important 
in situations where temporal enforcement is relatively inefficient. By extension, 
when cultures rely on a religion's non-temporal enforcement of appropriate 
social behavior, the religion will have doctrines that emphasize spiritual en­
forcement of that behavior. In particular, these cultures will have doctrines 
about the afterlife that include something like hell as punishment for misbehav­
ior, and misbehavior will be defined as breaking rules that arguably benefit 
society. Hell is not otherwise valuable and other cultures' religions will not 
feature hell. MARTY [1985], for example, uses this argument in analyzing the 
decline of hell doctrines in the U.S. in the last century. Hell as an enforcer of 
appropriate social behavior was widely recognized by Christian theologians 
until relatively recently. Interestingly, in the 1600s when the Christian doctrine 
of hell was first seriously questioned, many theologians who disbelieved in hell 
continued to advocate the doctrine in public and urged others to do so, citing its 
importance in preventing anarchy (WALKER [1964, 4, 6]). 
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Note that religion provides valuable products other than social goods and 
may be pervasive in cultures for other reasons, but these religions do not 
primarily assure appropriate behavior and will tend not to have doctrines that 
feature hell (contemporary U.S. religions are probably an example). In addi­
tion, although they can and do use temporal sanctions and rewards, including 
formal and informal punishment, religions by definition specialize in spiritual 
matters. Note finally that religions cannot enforce appropriate behavior simply 
by increasing the reward for heaven without increasing the cost of hell, as 
shown earlier. 
The remainder of this paper presents two case studies. The first analyzes the 
situation where the importance of non-temporal enforcement changes as the 
overall demand for enforcement increases. Church hell doctrine is shown to be 
more important in cultures of intermediate complexity. Data across cultures 
from the Human Relations Area Files confirm the model. The same data tend 
to weaken alternative views of the purpose of hell doctrines. The second case 
examines changes in hell doctrine in Colonial New England, a situation where 
the overall demand for social goods remained substantially the same but where 
the relative effectiveness of other producers of social goods changed significant­
ly. Not surprisingly, Puritan hell doctrine became more severe in times when the 
family, com'munity, and government were relatively weak. 
4. Case Study : The Human Relations Area Files 
Surely the key factor affecting the demand for social goods is the culture's 
technological complexity, meaning the complexity of property rights, produc­
tion, trade relations, and social interaction. As technological complexity in­
creases, spillover effects become more important and the possibilities for op­
portunistic behavior increase. 
Simple cultures only require simple behavior enforcement. POSNER [1980, 
10-19] explains how individuals in small communities in technologically simple 
cultures easily recognize the social costs ofdisease and poverty and so are likely 
to act to reduce them (to the extent they are aware of methods to do so). 
Property rights and contracts are relatively easy to define and enforce. The 
same applies when a culture is organized around extended families which share 
wealth and enforce appropriate family member behavior. In these cultures, 
religion and government are relatively unitnportant providers of social goods. 
In Robert NELSON'S words, "At the local level, there is less need for the unifying 
influence of a shared faith, ..." (NELSON [1991, 283]). 
We do not imply that what are termed here as technologically simple cultures 
are primitive or simple in other respects. Indeed, these cultures often have 
complex religions and rich institutions. The implication of the theory is not that 
religion is unimportant in these cultures, but that religion (and government) are 
relatively less important as producers of social goods. 
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By contrast, people in larger and technologically more complex communities 
are less able to recognize the social cost of individual misbehavior and are less 
likely to behave properly since anyone person's gain from proper behavior is 
so much smaller than the potential social gain. These communities are large 
enough that interaction takes place outside family groups but interaction is not 
extensive enough to include personal contact with all community members. 
Nelson continues, " ... as soon as the community expands beyond modest size, 
the number of contracts (some formal but many informal) becomes hopelessly 
large" (NELSON [1991, 283]). Here religions are relatively more important. 
HOMANS [1960, 378-384] explains how the Medieval Catholic church provid­
ed important social goods in communities like those outlined here. In previous 
work, HULL [1989] reviews changes in Medieval Catholic Church doctrine 
about the afterlife consistent with the model. Ecclesiastical courts emerged and 
reached their height of importance in the Medieval period as well (LEMIEUX 
[1934, 21]). DAVIES [1986] provides a similar illustration for communities of 
Mormons. HARRIS [1977, 144] asserts that Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity 
emerged and flourished because they were ideally suited for more complex and 
populous cultures. 
By contrast, religions again become relatively less effective in very large and 
technologically complex communities, in large part because property rights 
issues become too complex. Here the ability of government to enforce property 
rights, transfer income, and assure other proper behavior is relatively more 
effective than that of the church (BERGER [1967, 133, 136-138]). 
Other factors also affect the relative productivity of religions. As temporal 
wealth increases, temporal punishment by the government becomes more effec­
tive. The government's ability to tax and transfer income also improves relative 
to the church as individual wealth increases. Improvements in technology likely 
also favor government production of social goods. Further, as life expectancy 
increases, temporal punishment represents an increasing relative cost to indi­
viduals compared to punishment or reward in the afterlife. Religion thus has 
a comparative advantage in producing social goods in cultures of intermediate 
complexity, where the central government is too weak and where communities 
are too large to be effective. 
The Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) is a compilation of textual infor­
mation written by anthropologists about more than three hundred of the 
world's existing and past cultures. The unique characteristic of the HRAF is its 
indexing system. The textual material is indexed by seven hundred subject 
categories. 
Some of this textual material has been coded by anthropologists and sociol­
ogists, the first example being the Ethnographic Atlas (MURDOCK [1967]). Sub­
sequent researchers have coded material for a subset of cultures labelled the 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). SCCS cultures are chosen so that 
most cultural types are represented and that relatively comprehensive informa­
tion is available for each culture (MURDOCK and WHITE [1969], LAGACE [1979]). 
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While impressive, data coded from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample are 
not without problems. The first is that the original data were collected over a 
number of years by hundreds of anthropologists whose orientations changed 
over time and who were viewing cultures from a perspective different than that 
of economists. The process of assigning computer codes to the anthropologists' 
text is another source of inaccuracy. For a variable, coding involves interpret-
ing text written about each culture and assigning each culture to one of several 
ranked categories. 
Perhaps most important for our purposes however, is the fact that modern 
industrial cultures are not represented in the sample. Anthropologists, most 
often from developed countries, have tended not to study their own cultures. 
For this reason, implications of the theory must be adjusted to consider only 
cultures with less developed economies and governments. The extent to which 
any conclusions apply to modern industrial states, therefore, can only be in-
ferred. 
The first insight from the coded HRAF data is that belief in the afterlife is 
pervasive in cultures. Religions in ninety-eight percent of SCCS cultures for 
which data are available feature an afterlife. Although pervasive, the nature of 
the afterlife varies considerably between cultures. The following two variables 
illustrate this cultural variation. 
Variable AFTERLIFE: Complexity of the afterlife. 
percent of 
cultures category description 
in category 
2% No afterlife. 
18 % Afterlife is simple (i.e. sleep or join spirits) and is the same 
for everyone. 
30% Afterlife comes in one distinctly pleasant or unpleasant form 
and is the same for everyone. 
29 % Afterlife has two alternatives (like heaven and hell) and 
perhaps one extra stage (i.e. purgatory). 
21 % Afterlife is complex, including more than two alternatives 
and perhaps several stages. May include multiple souls or 
destinations. 
Variable ACHIEVE: Actions to achieve a pleasant afterlife. 
percent of 
cultures category description 
in category 
17% There is no afterlife or it is uniformly neutral or unpleasant. 
Pleasant afterlife requires no action or belief. 200/0 
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Pleasant afterlife requires simple actions, prayers, or inter­
cession. 
21 0/0 Pleasant afterlife requires significant alteration of behavior 
before death or actions by others after death but the 
required behavior does not benefit society (i.e. significant 
sacrifices, prayer). 
350/0 Pleasant afterlife requires significant alteration of behavior 
before death or actions by others after death and the 
required behavior benefits society (i.e. live a good life, 
donate to the poor). 
As with all HRAF coding, assigning codes to categories involves judgement 
on the part ofcoders. However, it is clear that attitudes about the afterlife differ 
significantly across cultures. Note especially how the ACHIEVE variable indi­
cates that achieving heaven in roughly half of cultures requires individuals to 
alter their behavior significantly. 
As suggested earlier, religions might include doctrines about hell to provide 
information, to expropriate rents, or to enforce appropriate social behavior. 
The variation between cultures in doctrines about the afterlife tends to weaken 
the first hypothesis. In addition, the variables AFTERLIFE and ACHIEVE are 
significantly positively correlated (rank correlation coefficient = 0.500, 
p = 0.082). That is, religions that feature complex afterlives that include hell 
also tend to require appropriate social behavior to get to heaven. This is 
consistent with the third hypothesis, that religion in general and hell in partic­
ular assures appropriate social behavior. 
What is the role of market structure on doctrines about the afterlife? If 
religions mainly expropriate rents, afterlife doctrines will change in a way to 
imply less complexity (no hell and so a lower cost for misbehavior) as the 
number of competing religions increases. The HRAF variable NUMBER mea­
sures the number of religions and sects in a culture. The variable takes a value 
of one for cultures with no formal religion and ranges up to a value of six for 
cultures with more than two distinct religions and additional cults. About 
twenty percent of cultures have one distinct religion and no additional cults. 
The variable NUMBER has a low, marginally significant, and positive correla­
tion with AFTERLIFE (correlation coefficient = 0.136, p = 0.099), and has 
a low, marginally significant, and positive correlation with ACHIEVE (rank 
correlation coefficient = 0.110, P = 0.100). These results weaken the rent 
expropriation hypothesis. 
If religious doctrine about the afterlife is used to enforce appropriate behav­
ior, doctrine will change as cultural characteristics change and the demand for 
appropriate behavior changes. The above implies a reduced form regression 
equation of the following form: 
Complexity = PI + P2Religion + P3Government + p4Community. 
458 Brooks B. Hull and Frederick Bold JJIl1TIE 
The theory suggests that the function will not in general be linear, since the 
church, for example, is relatively unimportant in both the most simple cultures 
and in the most complex cultures. However, because HRAF variable categories 
are so simple, a non-linear relationship likely would not appear. In addition, 
modern industrial states are not represented in the SCCS, so the .downward 
curved portion (right tail) of the function would not be present even if the 
coding was more explicit. No coded HRAF variables directly measure the 
technical complexity ofcultures. However, one coded HRAF variable measures 
the extent of a culture's written language. Because writing tends to evolve with 
a culture, a writing variable is an excellent proxy measure of a culture's com­
plexity. The variable WRITING takes a value of one if the culture has no 
writing and ranges up to a value of four if a culture has a fully-developed 
indigenous written language (MURDOCK and PROVOST [1973]). 
No direct or proxy measure of community is available in the HRAF coded 
data. Three proxies for religion are used. AFTERLIFE and ACHIEVE are 
described earlier. The variable PERVADE measures on a scale of one through 
four the degree to which high spiritual beings who created reality are active and 
supportive of human morality in the culture (MURDOCK [1967]). The variable 
POLICE is used to proxy for government enforcement of appropriate behavior. 
POLICE takes a value of one if the culture has no police force and ranges up 
to a value of five for a culture with a significant independent police force 
(TUDEN and MARSHALL [1972]). 
If churches produce property rights enforcement, the coefficient P2 will be 
positive. Silnple intuition suggests the coefficient P3 will be positive. The fact 
that the religion and government variables will increase as technical complexity 
increases implies a potential problem of multicollinearity. No obvious solution 
to this problem presents itself. Ordered multinomial logit results are summa­
rized in Table 1. Ordered multinomiallogit is the alternative to multiple regres­
sion analysis when the dependent variable is not continuous but has ranked 
categories. Interpretation of the coefficients is awkward, but only the signs and 
significances are necessary to test the model (SMITH [1981], MCCULLAGH 
[1980]). 
Our intuition about the relationship between government and technical com­
plexity is confirmed. The coefficients on the POLICE variable are positive and 
significant in every equation. The relationship between technical complexity 
and the various measures of religious enforcement is also positive, although not 
as consistently significant. The statistical results support the theory that 
churches in part encourage appropriate social behavior. 
5. Case Study: Colonial New England Puritans 
The treatment of hell by key Puritan clergy in Colonial New England provides 
strong anecdotal support for the idea that the afterlife encourages appropriate 
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Table 1 
Ordered Multinon1ial Logit Analysis
 
Dependent variable is WRITING
 
POLICE AFTERLIFE ACHIEVE PERVADE Pseudo R 2 
(1) 0.667 0.363 0.297 
(5.27) *** (1.96) ** 
(2) 0.449 0.253 
(2.52) ** 
(3) 0.605 0.211 0.280 
(4.87) *** (1.64) * 
(4) 0.300 0.243 
(2.39) ** 
(5) 0.616 0.497 0.294 
(3.78) *** (3.78) *** 
(6) 0.655 0.257 
(5.14) *** 
Each figure in parentheses is the ratio of the coefficient and its asymptotic standard 
deviation. This ratio is asymptotically normally distributed. N = 93. 
social behavior. Of particular interest is the fact that Puritan clergy promoted 
hell with greater intensity during periods when government, community, and 
the family were under stress. 
Summarizing the more the one hundred years of Colonial history in a few 
lines is obviously a dangerous exercise. However, we wish only to highlight a 
small number of relevant issues and to hint at one explanation for changes in 
New England church doctrine. A comprehensive analysis is far beyond the 
scope of this treatment. However, the New England Colonial case is useful 
because most cultural factors remained constant during the period, allowing us 
to focus on changes in the effectiveness of religion, government, family, and 
community where the overall demand for social goods was relatively constant. 
For our purpose, the Colonial period can be divided into four periods: from 
the founding of the Plymouth settlement in 1620 to 1660, from 1660 to 1700, 
from 1700 to 1740, and from 1740 to the Declaration of Independence in 1776. 
Each period corresponds roughly to a generation in Colonial history. Each 
generation, in turn, had a key minister, a theologian who guided or exemplified 
the beliefs of the Puritan community. In the second and fourth generations, 
Puritan clergy more actively promoted hell. 
Three background notes are in order. First, Puritan theology throughout the 
Colonial period recognized the existence of hell. However, although formal 
doctrine about hell did not change, emphasis by clergy ·of particular elements 
of the doctrine did change. Second, the dominant Puritan theology in the 
Colonial period asserted that a person's fate at death was preordained. Predes­
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tination would seem to render ineffective the threat of hell for misbehavior. 
Puritan theologians explicitly recognized this potential problem and adapted 
their view of predestination accordingly (WRIGHT [1955, 130-131]). Puritan 
doctrine asserted that those predestined to heaven could be recognized by their 
exemplary behavior and that those who clearly sinned were as clearly predes­
tined to hell. In addition, Arminianism, a branch of Puritanism which believed 
that freely chosen actions could influence a person's fate at death, became 
gradually more important in the Colonial period. As an aside consistent with 
the theory, Arminianism was much stronger in Boston, New England's major 
city, and as the theory implies, religion is most important in more complex 
settings but those missing a strong central government. 
The third note is that the importance of hell in Christian theology was 
declining overall in the colonies and in Europe from the mid 1600s (and contin­
ued to the present) (CAMPORESI [1990,101-104], MARTY [1985]). The two 
Colonial periods when hell was promoted represent reversals in a general trend. 
The first generation of Puritan clergy did not promote the doctrine of hell. 
The first colonists left England with shared values and a collective vision. They 
lived in small, closely knit, independent communities. The early communities 
were comfortable materially. A strongly-asserted hell doctrine was unnecessary 
in this environment. 
Thomas Hooker was the first generation's leading theologian. Interestingly, 
his most important work is only barely theological. A Survey of the Summe of 
Church-Discipline promotes reason, law, and responsible citizenship (HOOKER 
[1648]). Hooker also helped write the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut 
under which the colony was governed. Hell is not mentioned in the Fundamen­
tal Orders. 
The second generation of Puritans encountered a much less friendly envi­
ronment. The New England colonies suffered a sustained economic depression 
from the 1650s to the mid 1670s in part because the English Civil War disrupted 
immigration and so blocked the influx ofcapital and labor to the colonies. King 
Philip's and King William's war seriously affected New England communities. 
Some towns were abandoned due to attacks and the threat of attack from 
Native Americans. Colonial governance was disrupted by James II's unpopular 
appointment of Edmund Andros as governor of a new "Dominion of New 
England" and by Andros's subsequent ejection and arrest by the colonists. 
Puritan ministers responded to the relative weakness ofcommunities and the 
government. One of the most popular books in American history as measured 
by the proportion of the population who purchased it was Michael Wig­
glesworth's The Day ofDoom, or a Poetical Description of the Great and Last 
Judgement (WIGGLESWORTH [1701/1966]). It's first edition in 1662 was pur­
chased by roughly one person in twenty in New England. Seven more editions 
were printed by 1701. The book was popular especially as a reader for children. 
The Day ofDoom uses about fifty-six of its sixty or so pages to describe hell 
and the kinds of sinners who will fill it. Wigglesworth promises hell for any sort 
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of misbehavior, from murder and adultery to drunkenness. A special place in 
hell is reserved for vile children. 
The colonies' third generation began at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
The new century also marked a turn in the fortunes of the New England 
colonies. The New England economy began a thirty-year period of growth 
(MAIN [1985, 754-763]). Queen Anne's War (The War of Spanish Succession) 
did not affect the area. 
Cotton MATHER [1702/1977] was a key minister and theologian of the third 
colonial generation. Mather, also a scientist and a scholar, wrote more than 450 
books. His most important was an ecclesiastical history of New England, 
Magnalia Christi Americana, written in 1702 (MATHER [1702/1977]). Subse­
quent work even included a description of plant hybridization, hardly in the 
category of fire and brimstone. 
The fourth colonial generation again faced economic, social, and political 
turmoil. The colonial economy weakened beginning in the mid 1730s and 
entered a period of recession in the mid 1750s (MAIN [1985,115]). Family life 
faced serious disruptions. The premarital pregnancy rate rose through the 
1770s to a level only equalled in the present day (SMITH and HINDUS [1975]). 
Adults complained about the degenerate and "lewd" practices of the growing 
teenage population (EDWARDS [1737/1975, 321]). The political life of New 
England was disrupted first by the French and Indian War and then by the 
American Revolution. 
As before, Puritan clergy promoted hell. Two more editions of Wig­
glesworth's Day of Doom were published in the period. Jonathan EDWARDS 
[1741/1987, 341-352] in 1741 preached and published what is surely the most 
reprinted sermon in American history, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry 
God." The sermon was one of many sermons, letters, and books that Edwards 
used to counter the ten,dency in the previous generation to liberalize Puritan 
theology. Edwards sought successfully to make his parishioners feel the conse­
quence of sin and to participate at the deepest emotional level in the process of 
conversion (MILLER [1959]). "Sinners" is a classic and unequalled description 
of the consequence of sin. God holds sinners "over the pit of hell, much as one 
holds a spider, or some loathsome insect, over the fire ..." (EDWARDS [1741/ 
1987, 347]). Sinners "hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath 
flashing about it and ready every moment to singe it and burn it asunder ..." 
(EDWARDS [1741/1987, 347]). Edwards and others in the last colonial generation 
effectively responded to the relative weakness of other social institutions. 
6. Conclusion 
Economists are only beginning their study of religion and the church. Most of 
those who are researching religion, however, continue the tradition in econom­
ics of taking a society's underlying institutions as given. This paper attempts to 
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expand the literature on the economics of religion by exploring religion's role 
as a social institution. Religion, like government, family, and community can 
enforce property rights, reduce transaction costs, and encourage socially valu­
able behavior. 
This paper asserts that societies that prosper over time tend to possess social 
institutions that minimize the cost of enforcing desirable individual behavior. 
The relative importance of the church, government, family, and community in 
a society depend on their relative costs and on the nature of the production 
function of and the demand for appropriate social behavior. Religion has a 
comparative advantage in encouraging appropriate social behavior in more 
complex cultures without powerful central governments. Religions in these 
cultures promote doctrines rewarding particular member behavior with an 
appealing afterlife and punishing misbehavior with· an unpleasant afterlife. 
Statistical material from the Human Relations Area Files tends to support 
the model's implications about heaven and hell and provides some encourage­
ment for other of the model's implications. This paper's preliminary analysis 
obviously is incomplete, however. HRAF data require additional analysis. The 
possible problem of simultaneous determination of demand for and supply of 
social goods has not been addressed. ' 
New England colonial Puritan doctrine about hell also supports the theory. 
In periods when the social, family, and political life in New England were 
disrupted, Puritan clergy responded by increasing the degree of social enforce­
ment provided by the church in the form of increased attention to hell as the 
consequence of misbehavior. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die zentrale SchluBfolgerung dieses Beitrages ist, daB sich die Determinanten 
von Kirchendoktrinen uber das Leben nach dem Tod mittels okonomischer 
Argumente erkHiren lassen. Ebenso. wie der Staat, die Familie und andere 
Gemeinschaften kann eine Religion dazu dienen, Eigentumsrechte durchzuset­
zen und zu sozial wertvollem Handeln zu ermuntern. Insbesondere, wenn die 
Kirche im Vergleich zur staatl. Gewalt, Familien und anderen Gemeinschaften 
relativ einfluBreich ist, ist die Holle als Strafe fur die MiBachtung gesellschaft­
lich nutzlicher Regeln eine Komponente der religiosen Doktrin. Das statistische 
Material von den Human Relations Area Files stutzt im groBen und ganzen die 
hier prasentierten Modellimplikationen. Gleiches gilt fur die Fallstudie uber die 
kolonial-puritanische Doktrin zur Holle in Neuengland. 
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